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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between national culture differences and 
five-day cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers around cross-border merger 
announcements. The sample consists of 1,200 cross-border deals by frequent 
acquirers from emerging countries for the period of January 1, 1985 to June 30, 2008. 
The main objective is to analyze the relation between the difference in Hofstede 
(1984)’s four cultural dimensions --- power distance, individualism, masculinity, and 
uncertainty avoidance and the merger performance. The results imply the 
compatibility of some cultural dimensions, individualism in particular, that result in 
gains in merger. The results also show that the cultural effects vary with the firm size. 
In addition, the evidence provides support for the hubris hypothesis by Roll (1986). 
 
Keywords: Merger and Acquisition, National Culture differences, Merger 
Performance, Firm Size, Hubris  
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1 Introduction 
Many studies show that national culture is an important factor affecting post 
merger performance. The culture factor also affects the success of a merger (e.g., 
Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009). Many studies suggest that 
differences in cultures negatively affect merger performances. Cartwrig and Cooper 
(1993) note that “at best, merely half of all mergers and acquisitions meet the initial 
financial expectations”, and some attribute failure in mergers in part to culture 
distances. For example, Doney, Cannon, and Mullen (1998) state that “difficulty in 
merging firms’ cultures accounts for nearly one half of all the acquisition failures1”. 
Reus and Lamont (2009) state that culture distance “impedes understandability”, and 
“increases the ambiguity that strategic alliance partners experience about the 
knowledge they wish to transfer”. Ahern, Deminelli, and Fracassi (2010) conclude 
that differences in national culture cause “reduction in the volume of cross-border 
mergers, as well as the total value they create”.  
On the other hand, there are also many studies indicating that the culture distance 
has a positive effect on merger, especially in the long term, but the positive impact of 
cultural differences “might not be captured in the announcement period returns” 
(Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009). Foreign acquirers have a higher 
probability to fail in the culture adjustment process (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 
1996), but following a cross-border acquisition, two firms can “learn from each 
other at various operating levels” (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). Hence, cultural 
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 The acquisition either does not come through or leads to a lower stock price after the merger 
announcement. 
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differences may enhance merger synergies through capability transfer, resources 
sharing, and learning (Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009). 
This study examines the relation between the culture difference and performance 
of frequent cross-border acquirers from emerging countries. The major difference 
between this study and prior studies is that this study concentrates on frequent 
acquirers—specifically, firms that make more than one cross-border acquisition 
during a five-year period. The main motivation to study frequent acquirers is that 
learning effects, as suggested by some previous studies, might be relevant in 
international acquisitions and especially important for frequent acquirers. Moreover, 
many of these studies examine the impact of the culture distance by using Hofstede’s 
cultural distance index (CDI)
2
, and assume that power distance
3
, individualism
4
, 
masculinity
5
, and uncertainty avoidance
6
 are of equal importance. However, the four 
dimensions of national culture might not have equal importance in terms of their 
impacts on mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, in this study each of the four culture 
dimensions is analyzed. Last and not least important, this study also examines the 
collective effects of firm size with each of the four national culture dimensions, along 
with the effect of the deal order, the initial success, and the interaction effect of the 
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 , where DA,i is the acquirer score on the i
th
 cultural dimension; DT,i 
is the target score on the i
th
 cultural dimension. 
3
 PDI is the extent to which the members of a society accept that power in institutions and 
organizations is distributed unequally (Hofstede 1984). 
4
 IDV is the preference for a loosely knit social framework, in which people take care of themselves 
and their immediate families only (Hofstede 1984).  
5
 MAS is the preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success 
(Hofstede1984). 
6
 UAI is the degree to which people feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity (Hofstede 
1984). 
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deal order and initial success.  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 reviews the 
literature about the impact of the culture distance on the merger performance; section 
3 describes the source of the data and the use of the multiple regressions; section 4 
discusses the empirical results; and section 5 gives the conclusions. 
 
2 Literature Review 
Hofstede (1984) defines culture as the “collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the member of one group or society from those of another”. He 
uses four dimensions --- power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty 
avoidance --- to illustrate culture. Power distance is “the extent to which the members 
of a society accept that power in institutions and organizations is distributed 
unequally”. Individualism stands for the preference for a loosely knit social 
framework, in which people take care of themselves and their immediate families only. 
Masculinity measures the preference in society for “achievement, heroism, 
assertiveness, and material success”. And uncertainty avoidance is “the degree to 
which people feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity”. The values of the 
index are given in Table 1. For example, the United States has an individual index of 
91, whereas those in Asia tend to be lower (e.g., Taiwan =17), reflecting generally 
lower degree of individualism in Asia. The four cultural dimensions have been 
extensively used in empirical studies of management, as well as in international 
mergers and acquisitions. In particular, “these three culture dimensions --- power 
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distance, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance distinguish one country’s culture 
from another and have important managerial implications” (Cheng & Seeger, 2012). 
Angwin (2011) studies the influence of national culture differences in business culture 
on pre-acquisition management by following the scores of the five European countries 
along the four cultural dimensions, and suggests that “national cultural difference can 
affect the perceived deal value”.  
The four cultural dimensions are also important in determining the cultural fit 
between the acquirer and the target. Bruhn (2001) argues that a major problem in the 
merger process appears to be a poor national cultural fit between the cross-border 
merging organizations, and many acquisition failures can be prevented through pre 
merger culture audit or assessment. Cheng and Seeger (2012) study the case that the 
Taiwanese firm BenQ Debacle acquired the money-losing mobile phone division of 
the German firm Siemens. They analyze the cultural distance in uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, and power distance, as well as corporate culture, communication issues, 
languages, and face saving, and conclude that “the two companies’ contrasting culture 
increased the likelihood of an incompatible integration process and implementation 
problem, and made it highly unlikely that they would add value and create synergy”. 
Therefore, they recommend that cross-culture merger should have a strategic 
communication plan in advance that clarifies the objectives and performance 
expectations during the integration and implementation process to avoid the 
information gap with future employees. Weber, Shenkar, and Raveh (1996)
7
 explore 
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 They use the nonparametric co-plot method. 
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the cultural fit in two groups of mergers. They conclude that “a lack of cultural fit 
may undermine the prospect of achieving synergy or add cost to the integration 
process”, after measuring the national culture differentials on uncertainty avoidance, 
power distance, masculinity, and individualism, as well as the corporate culture 
differentials, the autonomy removal, the stress, the attitude toward cooperating with 
other top management team, the group attitude toward new organizations, the 
commitment, and the cooperation. Morosini and Singh (1994) conduct a survey of 
400 companies engaged in cross-border mergers and acquisitions by focusing on two 
national cultural dimensions --- individualism and uncertainty avoidance, and they 
demonstrate that a national culture compatible post-acquisition strategy implemented 
by the acquiring company to interact with the target company’s national culture can 
improve merger performance.   
In sum, the extant evidence suggests that the national cultural compatibility is an 
important factor in determining the success of cross-border mergers and acquisitions.  
 
3 Data and Method 
3.1 The Sample 
The sample data consists of 1,200 cross-border deals and come from the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions data base. These firms 
are from emerging markets and make multiple cross-border acquisitions from January 
1, 1985 to June 30, 2008. Only acquisitions that were completed within 1,000 days of 
announcements are included in this sample. The acquirers must be in the Wharton 
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Research Data Service (WRDS) or the Compustat Global, with firm level information, 
such as stock price available, and the acquiring firms must be public to ensure the 
availability of such data. Special cases in mergers and acquisitions are excluded --- 
Acquirers and targets in the industries of utility or financial institution are excluded. 
Clustered acquisitions where a bidder acquires two or more firms within five days are 
excluded (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002). Deals with transaction value lower 
than $1 million, target size less than 1% of that of the acquirer, deals in which an 
acquirer owning more than 50% of the target before the acquisition, and deals in 
which data on Hofstede’s cultural measures are lacking in one or two countries 
involved are also excluded. Single acquirers
8
 are not included in the analysis, since 
they are not the focus here; it should also be noted that deals conducted by single 
acquirers account for roughly 38% of all deals, so multiple (frequent) acquirers are 
common in emerging countries.  
The 17 emerging countries of acquirers include Brazil, China, Greece, Hong 
Kong, India, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan, whereas the target firms 
are domiciled in 65 developed and emerging countries. The top three acquiring 
(emerging) countries are Norway,
9
 India, and Hong Kong, whereas the top three 
target countries are the U.S, Australia, and the U.K. Table 1 gives a breakdown of 
acquiring and target countries.  
3.2 Measuring Merger Performance 
                                                             
8
 Acquirers that acquire only one firm within a 5-year period. 
9
 It should be noted Norway is now considered as a developed country, though for a part of the sample 
period it is classified as emerging. 
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The event study method is employed to analyze the performance of repeated 
acquirers. The acquirer’s abnormal return around the merger announcement is 
calculated by using the market adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
Where ARit is the abnormal return of firm i on day t, Rit is the return of firm i on day t, 
and Rmt is the value-weighted (acquirer) market index return. The cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) for the five - day period (-2, +2) around the announcement 
of a merger is: 
     





2
2
)2,2(
t
t
iti ARCAR                                                                                              
    Multiple regression analysis is then carried out to investigate the factors that can 
potentially explain the variations in abnormal returns. 
3.3 The Regression Model 
    To explain the variations in abnormal returns, the following multivariate model is 
adopted. Most of the variables follow those of Al-Rahahleh & Wei (2010). 
 
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return that measures the excess 
returns over the five-day period of the merger announcement.  
Independent Variables: 
PDI = the absolute value of the difference of Hofstede’s power distance score 
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between the acquirer firm and the target firm;  
IDV = the absolute value of the difference of Hofstede’s individualism score 
between the acquirer firm and the target firm; 
MAS = the absolute value of the difference of Hofstede’s masculinity score 
between the acquirer firm and the target firm; 
UAI = the absolute value of the difference of Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance 
score between the acquirer firm and the target firm; 
Firm Size = the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets; 
PDI * Firm Size = the collective effect of the absolute value of the difference in 
power distance and firm size; 
IDV * Firm Size = the collective effect of the absolute value of the difference in 
individualism and firm size; 
MAS * Firm Size = the collective effect of the absolute value of the difference in 
masculinity and firm size; 
UAI * Firm Size = the collective effect of the absolute value of the difference in 
uncertainty avoidance and firm size; 
Successful First = dummy variable that takes the value of one if the first 
acquisition is successful, otherwise zero; 
Deal Order * Successful First = the collective effect of deal order and successful 
first. It takes the value of deal order if the dummy is equal to one; 
Same Industry = dummy variable, takes the value of one if the acquirer and the 
target are in the same industry defined by 3-digit SIC code, and otherwise takes zero; 
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Period between acquisitions = dummy variable, takes the value of one if the time 
between acquisition is more than one year; 
Tender offer = dummy variable, takes the value of one if the acquisition is a 
tender offer; 
Cash = dummy variable, takes the value of one if transaction made in cash or in 
cash and debt; 
Hostile = dummy variable, takes the value of one if the merger is hostile 
according to SDC; 
Compete = dummy variable, takes the value of one if there is more than one 
bidder; 
Public = dummy variable, takes the value of one if the target is a public firm; 
Private = dummy variable, takes the value of one if the target is a private firm; 
Competition = computed as the number of targets over the total number of firms 
in a target country in a year. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. 
  
4 Results and Discussions 
4.1 Merger Performance  
Table 3 and the figure after it present the relationship between the acquirers’ 
average cumulative abnormal returns and deal order. The average cumulative 
abnormal return declines significantly from 2.61% for the first deals to 1.14% for the 
second deals. For higher-order deals, returns do not always decrease monotonically 
with the deal order; however, the overall trend that the average cumulative abnormal 
10 
 
returns decline with the increase of deal order is fairly clear. The declining pattern is 
consistent with studies that examine frequent acquirers such as Al-Rahahleh & Wei 
(2010). One explanation for the declining pattern comes from Roll (1986) that 
suggests overconfident managers might pay too much for mergers. Other explanations 
are based on learning or information asymmetry. The reasons for declining returns are 
not the focus of this study, hence they will not be further analyzed. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that returns do vary with deal order, and that previous studies on 
culture and performance do not control for the deal order while this study does. 
This declining trend is also obvious when looking at the merger performance of 
each acquiring country in the first two deals. For the sake of brevity, 
country-by-country results are not reported but summarized below. Of the 17 
acquiring countries, only Philippine, Poland, and South Africa show an increase of the 
average cumulative abnormal return from the first deal to the second deal, but these 
three countries’ average cumulative abnormal returns on the first deals are either 
negative or slightly above zero, which means that their first deals are not that 
successful. Countries (Brazil, China
10
, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Korea, Malaysia, 
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, and Taiwan) that have a significant 
positive average CAR in the first deal all experience a sharp decline in the 2
nd
 deals 
probably due to the hubris behavior of CEOs, and about half of them experience an 
even further decline of CAR in subsequent deals. For example, in China, the 
acquirers’ average CARs of the first deal orders is 6.01%. It declines to -2.88% for the 
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second deals and to -3.50% of the third deals. In Portugal, the average CARs of the 
first deal order is 4.06%; it decreases to 0.78% in the second deals and turns to 
negative in the third deals.  
Table 4 presents the analysis of the effects of industry and firm organizations. Of 
the deals that involve the same industry, the acquirers’ average cumulative abnormal 
return is 1.68% for private targets, higher than those of public and subsidiary targets. 
For deals involving different industries, private targets also experience higher average 
cumulative abnormal return. Acquiring firms with public targets have the lowest 
average cumulative abnormal returns of deals regardless of whether the deals 
involving the same or different industries. This is probably because public targets 
have higher liquidity, hence higher premiums are required. Also, the mean cumulative 
abnormal return involving different industries is higher than that involving the same 
industry. This might be partially consistent with the hubris hypothesis by Roll (1986). 
Specifically, when CEOs are familiar with the industry, they might become 
overconfident and overpay for targets (hence lower abnormal returns).   
4.2 Cultural Effects and Their Interactions with Firm Size  
Table 5 reports the regression results, where the independent variables include all 
cultural variables, firm size, interactions of cultural factors and firm size, and other 
relevant factors. The results regarding the cultural factors are discussed first. The table 
indicates that the differences in cultural dimensions that have a significant effect on 
CARs are the distance in individualism
11
 (at the 5% level) and the distance in 
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uncertainty avoidance (at the 10% level). The effect of the difference in power 
distance is marginally significant (at 11%). The coefficient of the difference in 
masculinity is not significant. The differences in power distance and the uncertainty 
avoidance are negatively correlated to the cumulative abnormal returns, whereas the 
difference in individualism is positively correlated to returns. These results imply that 
the difference in individualism is more likely to be integrated or coordinated, hence 
beneficial to the acquirers. Indeed, some literature suggests that individualism and the 
opposite of individualism--collectivism do not necessarily contradict each other. If so, 
it makes sense that, relative to other cultural dimensions, differences in individualism 
tend to be more beneficial. In order to see whether the culture dimensions have 
different impacts on large and small firms, the interactive variables PDI*firm size, 
IDV*firm size, MAS*firm size, and UAI*firm size are incorporated. The results show 
that the interaction term of individualism and firm size is significantly negative, 
indicating that the benefit gets smaller the larger the firm. Perhaps this can be 
explained by larger firms typically having more existing international operations, 
hence the marginal benefit of additional mergers is on average smaller.   
4.3 Other Factors 
    Table 5 reports that firm size is significant and negatively correlated to the CARs. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
from which the individualist and collectivist societies are different. In the mechanism of “super 
ordinate goal”, individualists have interdependence goals, which refers to the relationship that the goals 
of each individual can be achieved only if the goals of others can be achieved. Collectivists, on the 
other hand, share a common goal. These two types of super ordinate goals do not contradict each other, 
because when everyone working toward their goals, which are interdependent, might have the same 
effect as working toward a common goal. In other words, people working toward a common goal might 
still working toward their own goals at the same time. Group identity formation is “an effective 
mechanism for inducing cooperation” (Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1988). When cooperation 
increases, the new group identity enhances personal identities in an individualist culture, while new 
group identity complements existing group identities in collectivist culture.  
13 
 
The implication is that larger firms can benefit less from the diversification brought 
by mergers and acquisitions than smaller firms. A potential explanation for this is that 
learning and coordination might be more difficult as a firm gets larger. Moreover, 
larger firms tend to be firms that operate in multiple countries and have already staffs 
that are familiar with an international environment. Therefore, the marginal benefit 
from cross-border mergers is not likely to be considerable for these firms. However, 
the variable firm size*firm size is significantly positive, suggesting a non-linear 
relation between firm size and merger benefits.   
The variables successful first (i.e., first deals with positive abnormal returns) and 
deal order*successful first are significantly positive and negative, respectively. The 
positive sign for successful first is not surprising because, by definition, these are 
deals with positive abnormal returns. The negative sign of deal order*successful 
might be consistent with the hubris hypothesis first proposed by Roll (1986), as 
follows. When managers are infected by over-confidence, having first deals being 
successful further reinforces their confidence; consequently, in later deals, they might 
either pay too much or pursue less justifiable deals. Finally, the variable Cash is 
significant and positively related to cumulative abnormal returns. This is perhaps 
because acquisitions in cash can reduce the uncertainty associated with mergers.
12
  
 
5 Conclusions 
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 As compared to cash transactions, mergers involving stock exchanges mean more value uncertainty 
to target shareholders. This is also consistent with Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman (2009) 
conclusion that “… friendly deals and cash acquisitions do better in the long run”. 
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Based on the existing literature, the national culture is an important factor 
affecting the merger performance, and the culture fit affects the success of mergers 
and acquisitions. In this study, a sample of 1,200 cross-border deals by frequent 
acquirers from emerging countries, for the period of January 1, 1985 to June 30, 2008, 
is used to study the relation between culture and acquirers’ performances. Of 
particular focus is the relationship between the difference of four cultural dimensions 
and the cumulative abnormal return during the five-day period of merger 
announcements. The results confirm the importance of the role of culture in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In particular, the results indicate that the 
difference in individualism is positively related to merger performance, whereas the 
differences in other cultural dimensions are negative and insignificant at 5% level. 
This suggests that differences in individualism are easier to resolve and large 
differences in individualism tend to be more beneficial to merger success, while large 
differences in power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance are either 
harmful or not beneficial to merger. Furthermore, the interaction term of 
individualism and firm size is significantly negative, indicating that the benefit gets 
smaller the larger the firm. The evidence also provides some support for the hubris 
hypothesis by Roll (1986).  
15 
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Table 1 Breakdown of acquiring and target countries  
Acquiring Countries 
country Frequency Percent PDI IDV MAS UAI 
Brazil 32 2.67 69 38 49 76 
China 7 0.58 80 20 66 30 
Greece 49 4.08 60 35 57 112 
Hong Kong 145 12.08 68 25 57 29 
India 163 13.58 77 48 56 40 
Korea 63 5.25 60 18 39 85 
Mexico 57 4.75 81 30 69 82 
Malaysia 65 5.42 104 26 50 36 
Norway 243 20.25 31 69 8 50 
New Zealand 80 6.67 22 79 58 49 
Philippine 6 0.50 94 32 64 44 
Poland 13 1.08 68 60 64 93 
Portugal 39 3.25 63 27 31 104 
Russia 26 2.17 93 39 36 95 
Singapore 68 5.67 74 20 48 8 
Taiwan 40 3.33 58 17 45 69 
South Africa 104 8.67 49 65 63 49 
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Target Countries 
country Frequency Percent PDI IDV MAS UAI 
Argentina 11 0.92 49 46 56 86 
Australia 115 9.58 36 90 61 51 
Austria 13 1.08 11 55 79 70 
Belgium 9 0.75 65 75 54 94 
Brazil 43 3.58 69 38 49 76 
Bulgaria 6 0.50 70 30 40 85 
Canada 39 3.25 39 80 52 48 
Chile 9 0.75 63 23 28 86 
China 57 4.75 80 20 66 30 
Colombia 3 0.25 67 13 64 80 
Costa Rica 3 0.25 35 15 21 86 
Czech Republic 6 0.50 57 58 57 74 
Denmark 23 1.92 18 74 16 23 
Ecuador 2 0.17 78 8 63 67 
Egypt 4 0.33 80 38 52 68 
Estonia 4 0.33 40 60 30 60 
Finland 14 1.17 33 63 26 59 
France 23 1.92 68 71 43 86 
Germany 47 3.92 35 67 66 65 
Ghana 1 0.08 77 20 46 54 
Greece 5 0.42 60 35 57 112 
Guatemala 3 0.25 95 6 37 101 
Hong Kong 48 4.00 68 25 57 29 
Hungary 5 0.42 46 80 88 82 
India 22 1.83 77 48 56 40 
Indonesia 23 1.92 78 14 46 48 
Ireland-Rep 5 0.42 28 70 68 35 
Israel 4 0.33 13 54 47 81 
Italy 19 1.58 50 76 70 75 
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Target Countries 
country Frequency Percent PDI IDV MAS UAI 
Jamaica 1 0.08 45 39 68 13 
Japan 17 1.42 54 46 95 92 
Libya 1 0.08 80 38 52 68 
Luxembourg 1 0.08 40 60 50 70 
Malaysia 22 1.83 104 26 50 36 
Mexico 4 0.33 81 30 69 82 
Morocco 1 0.08 70 46 53 68 
Netherlands 11 0.92 38 80 14 53 
New Zealand 22 1.83 22 79 58 49 
Nigeria 2 0.17 77 20 46 54 
Norway 9 0.75 31 69 8 50 
Pakistan 1 0.08 55 14 50 70 
Panama 1 0.08 95 11 44 86 
Peru 7 0.58 64 16 42 87 
Philippines 3 0.25 94 32 64 44 
Poland 13 1.08 68 60 64 93 
Portugal 1 0.08 63 27 31 104 
Romania 6 0.50 90 30 42 90 
Singapore 33 2.75 74 20 48 8 
South Africa 21 1.75 49 65 63 49 
South Korea 3 0.25 60 18 39 85 
Spain 19 1.58 57 51 42 86 
Sweden 57 4.75 31 71 5 29 
Switzerland 15 1.25 34 68 70 58 
Taiwan 20 1.67 58 17 45 69 
Tanzania 1 0.08 64 27 41 52 
Thailand 21 1.75 64 20 34 64 
Tunisia 1 0.08 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 8 0.67 66 37 45 85 
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Target Countries 
country Frequency Percent PDI IDV MAS UAI 
United Kingdom 108 9.00 35 89 66 35 
United States 196 16.33 40 91 62 46 
Uruguay 1 0.08 61 36 38 100 
Utd Arab Em 3 0.25 80 38 52 68 
Venezuela 2 0.17 81 12 73 76 
Vietnam 1 0.08 70 20 40 30 
Zambia 1 0.08 64 27 41 52 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev Median Kurtosis Skewness 
CARs 1.507  7.342  0.718  11.030  1.975  
PDI 19.330  16.426  14.000  0.201  0.855  
IDV 23.448  21.862  19.000  -0.577  0.785  
MAS 15.734  17.446  9.000  1.022  1.457  
UAI 18.589  17.461  15.000  1.003  1.123  
PDI*firm size 135.845  126.406  102.352  2.209  1.367  
IDV*firm size 165.409  173.242  107.802  1.705  1.369  
MAS*firm size 107.304  128.777  54.607  3.333  1.850  
UAI*firm size 132.336  136.418  89.534  1.989  1.393  
Successful first 0.625  0.484  1.000  -1.736  -0.517  
Deal order*successful first 2.118  3.302  1.000  15.983  3.453  
Firm size 6.697  2.008  6.627  -0.196  0.141  
Firm size*firm size 48.830  28.010  43.875  1.770  0.952  
Same industry 0.425  0.495  0.000  -1.911  0.304  
Period between acquisition 24.015  166.292  1.000  112.728  9.843  
Tender offer 0.040  0.196  0.000  20.130  4.701  
Cash 0.210  0.407  0.000  0.033  1.426  
Hostile 0.003  0.058  0.000  296.241  17.255  
Compete 0.011  0.104  0.000  87.535  9.455  
Public 0.197  0.398  0.000  0.336  1.528  
Private 0.460  0.499  0.000  -1.977  0.161  
Competition 3.337  3.448  2.169  3.728  1.857  
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Table 3 The relationship between cumulative abnormal returns (in %) and deal order  
 
 
Deal Order N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1 349 2.613  8.422  -18.372  51.758  
2 352 1.136  7.096  -19.196  32.661  
3 174 1.877  7.824  -15.421  63.370  
4 99 0.765  5.726  -13.905  24.029  
5 65 0.767  7.210  -14.273  41.334  
6 40 0.551  4.749  -12.865  11.379  
7 28 -0.483  5.520  -10.557  12.376  
8 18 0.927  5.061  -9.462  9.468  
9 15 0.510  3.447  -6.547  7.188  
10 13 0.497  11.237  -23.038  30.489  
11 10 0.138  3.338  -5.373  6.861  
12 6 0.094  3.044  -2.780  4.703  
13 6 -1.695  1.730  -3.355  0.742  
14 4 0.182  3.995  -2.921  5.882  
15 4 0.005  5.608  -5.488  5.828  
16 3 -0.450  1.762  -2.484  0.583  
17 2 3.386  9.788  -3.535  10.308  
18 2 2.581  0.436  2.273  2.889  
19 1 -0.904  . -0.904  -0.904  
20 2 1.059  1.327  0.121  1.997  
21 1 0.254  . 0.254  0.254  
22 1 -0.001  . -0.001  -0.001  
23 1 0.127  . 0.127  0.127  
24 1 0.006  . 0.006  0.006  
25 1 0.653  . 0.653  0.653  
26 1 0.133  . 0.133  0.133  
27 1 -0.183  . -0.183  -0.183  
 
 
24 
 
Graph 1 Trend of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
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Table 4 Summary statistics of cumulative abnormal returns in percent by industry 
relatedness and public/prvate sectors 
 
Industry 
Relatedness 
Sector N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Different 
Industries 
Subsidiary 238 1.604  6.814  -15.584  47.380  
Public 125 1.469  6.862  -16.731  30.611  
Private 327 1.721  7.297  -23.038  51.758  
Same  Industry 
Subsidiary 174 1.571  8.057  -18.297  63.370  
Public 111 0.265  7.103  -19.196  22.328  
Private 225 1.681  7.751  -18.372  41.334  
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Table 5 Results of the Multiple Regression 
This table summarizes the results of multiple regression analysis. Dependent variable is the CAR that measures the 
excess returns over the five-day period of the merger announcement. PDI, IDV, MAS, and UAI are the absolute 
value of the difference of Hofstede’s power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance score 
between the acquirer and the target firm; PDI * Firm Size, IDV * Firm Size, MAS * Firm Size, and UAI * Firm Size 
are the collective effect of the absolute value of the difference in PDI, IDV, MAS, and UAI and firm size; 
Successful First takes the value of one if the first acquisition is successful, otherwise zero; Deal Order * Successful 
First is the collective effect of deal order and successful first and takes the value of deal order if the dummy is 
equal to one; Same Industry takes the value of one if the acquirer and the target are in the same industry defined by 
3-digit SIC code; Period between acquisitions takes the value of one if the time between acquisition is more than 
one year; Tender offer takes the value of one if the acquisition is a tender offer; takes the value of one if transaction 
made in cash or in cash and debt; Hostile takes the value of one if the merger is hostile according to SDC; Compete 
takes the value of one if there is more than one bidder; Public takes the value of one if the target is a public firm; 
Private takes the value of one if the target is a private firm; Competition is computed as the number of targets over 
the total number of firms in a target country in a year. 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 11.083  2.428  4.57 <.0001 
PDI -0.099  0.062  -1.59 0.113  
IDV 0.110  0.051  2.17 0.031  
MAS -0.033  0.046  -0.72 0.473  
UAI -0.086  0.048  -1.79 0.074  
PDI*firm size 0.010  0.009  1.09 0.275  
IDV*firm size -0.012  0.007  -1.71 0.088  
MAS*firm size 0.008  0.007  1.28 0.200  
UAI*firm size 0.009  0.007  1.3 0.194  
Successful first 4.442  0.577  7.7 <.0001 
Deal order*successful first -0.321  0.097  -3.32 0.001  
Firm size -2.654  0.636  -4.17 <.0001 
Firm size*firm size 0.134  0.048  2.8 0.005  
Same industry -0.557  0.471  -1.18 0.237  
Period between acquisitions -0.001  0.002  -0.8 0.426  
Tender offer -0.382  1.419  -0.27 0.788  
Cash 1.480  0.575  2.57 0.010  
Hostile -2.093  3.716  -0.56 0.574  
Compete 0.255  2.590  0.1 0.922  
Public -1.124  0.707  -1.59 0.112  
Private -0.460  0.539  -0.85 0.394  
Competition  -0.006  0.077  -0.08 0.935  
R-Square 0.120  Adj R-Sq 0.099  
 

